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There are four components of a safety management system: safety policy 
and objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. 
This paper focuses on safety risk management. Hazard identification is the first step 
of safety risk management. In order to mitigate risk, one must first understand the 
hazard (International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 2018; Stolzer, Halford, 
& Goglia, 2011). 
Poor human-machine interaction can sometimes end with catastrophic 
results. The Lion Air and Ethiopian Air 737 Max crashes, as a result of anomalies 
with the flight control software of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation 
System, are a current example of these catastrophic results (Gitlin, 2019). These 
accidents were the result of a human-machine interface hazard, which was 
presumably not understood by the aviation industry. 
Problem Statement 
Airline operators functioning under Federal Aviation Administration Part 
121 are required to execute a safety management system. Part of an effective safety 
management system is understanding (and mitigating) hazards (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2015). Assuming the Boeing 737 Max hazard is not understood by 
the industry, then what other human-machine interface hazards could exist within 
Part 121 operations?   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to identify human-machine interface hazards, 
which lead to poor performance. Once these human-machine interface hazards in 
Part 121 operations are identified and understood, these hazards can be mitigated.  
Research Question 
This research seeks to discover what common hazards, if any, lead to poor 
performance as a result of human-machine interface anomalies as identified in 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Part 121 reports. 
Delimitations 
 The current study is delimited in several ways. First, while human-machine 
interface challenges can result in decreased performance on any flight, this study 
was limited to Part 121 operations due to the structure created by the increased 
regulations of Part 121 operations. Second, the data spans two years, 2017 and 
2018. The study was limited to these years for project scope manageability. Finally, 
the coding within the qualitative analysis was limited to one researcher, however; 
in the future, the research can be expanded to additional coders to increase validity 
and measure inter-rater reliability.   
Limitations and Assumptions 
The results are limited to Part 121 operations, and cannot be generalized to 
other flying operations. The author assumes accuracy of the information submitted 
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by the ASRS reporter. The ASRS reports are voluntary, therefore, they cannot be 
used for consideration of prevalence of occurrence, and reporting bias exists 
because who and when personnel report is indeterminant; the power of the reports 
is in qualitative analysis, which supports the use of the reports for this study.  
 
Literature Review 
Humans’ interaction with other humans does not always result in optimum 
performance. The same holds true for humans interacting with machines. 
 
The benefits anticipated by designers and policy makers when 
implementing automation—increased efficiency, improved safety, 
enhanced flexibility of operations, lower operator workload, and so on—
may not always be realized and can be offset by human performance costs 
associated with maladaptive use of poorly designed or inadequately trained-
for automation. (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010, p. 381) 
 
Therefore, automation should increase efficiency, safety, and flexibility, and 
decrease workload. However, automation use can “increase workload and training 
requirements, decrease situational awareness, and, in extreme circumstances, lead 
to accidents” (Miller & Parasuraman, 2007, p. 57). If human-machine interaction 
is not designed appropriately for the task, workload can increase (Cuevas, Fiore, 
Caldwell, & Strater, 2007). Increases in workload result in higher operator reliance 
on automation irrespective of trust in automation. Categorizing increased workload 
and decreased situation awareness associated with automation use can be 
challenging, but Endsley (2017) has introduced the human-autonomy system 
oversight (HASO) model based on over 20-years of trust in automation and 
situation awareness research. 
The HASO model (Figure 1) provides a construct for designing the 
appropriate amount of human-automation interaction into a system to support 
attention allocation in the performance of tasks. The HASO model is a complex 
interaction of multiple aspects of the human operator and the automation. Attention 
allocation is at the center of the HASO model. Attention allocation can be 
influenced by the performance of the automation, and effect the performance 
(situation awareness) of the operator. The HASO model provides a construct for 
designing the appropriate amount of human-automation interaction into a system 
to support attention allocation in the performance of tasks. This model can be used 
as a baseline for the node taxonomy. 
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Figure 1. Human-autonomy system oversight (HASO) model (Endsley, 2017). 
 
Methodology 
Description of the dataset 
The data for this research was obtained from the ASRS database. The search 
parameters included reports from January 2017 to December 2018 from Part 121 
operations where human factors were the primary problem and human-machine 
interface was a reported human factor. This dataset contained 163 reports.  
Data Analysis Method  
The initial query of ASRS reports resulted in 163 reports. The synopsis of 
each of the 163 reports was reviewed to identify reports related to performance 
decrement due to human-machine interface. Of the 163 initial reports, 123 reports 
were identified as containing a performance problem related to human-machine 
interface. The full report narrative for each of the 123 reports was extracted from 
the ASRS database, and saved as separate Microsoft Word files. Each file was 
named as the report number. The 123 reports were imported into NVivo Plus 
version 12 for exploration, coding and analysis. 
The first step in data exploration was to explore the dataset reports using 
the NVivo word frequency function. A word frequency query was executed to 
identify the top 100 exact matches of words four letters or longer. Four letters were 
used as a parameter to exclude modifier words or personal pronouns three letters or 
less (e.g. the, an, he, she). NVivo provides a function to exclude specific words 
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from the frequency query; ‘asrs’ is the only word eliminated from the frequency 
query. All other words were applicable. The word cloud function was used to reveal 
prominent words to use in coding. Next, the tree map and cluster analysis functions 
were used to identify potential nodes for analysis. In the end, the HASO model was 
the primary mechanism to drive the node taxonomy (Appendix A). Situation 
awareness and automation oversight and interaction performance are constructs in 
the HASO model; however, they were not included as nodes in the taxonomy 
because they are the outcome (results) of the other nodes within the HASO model. 
This research seeks to understand the factors that contribute to the negative 
outcomes.  
The node taxonomy at Appendix A was input into NVivo for qualitative 
analysis. The nodes were organized as nodes with child nodes for additional 
specificity within the parent node. For example, mental model was a parent node of 
mental model influenced by automation interface and mental model influenced by 
complexity. During the coding process, 19 reports were removed from the dataset 
because they did not contain factors associated with human-machine interface that 
lead to poor performance. Each of the 104 reports were coded separately using 
interactive coding. This is a manual coding process where the researcher highlights 
excerpts from the narrative, and connects this highlighted text with a node in the 
node taxonomy. Once all data was coded, it was available for analysis in NVivo. 
 
Results 
The dataset was analyzed various ways using NVivo. First, data analysis 
was accomplished using the charts function in NVivo. The charts function provides 
multiple means to chart the nodes and classifications. Classifications are essentially 
defining attributes for each of the reports. The classification attributes are month, 
time of day, control function (the ground control entity communicating with pilots), 
and flight phase. The classifications where compared with nodes in the charts 
function. The y-axis was identified as number of times a node was identified in the 
ASRS reports.  
The charts function provided telling results. First, the chart function 
revealed a higher number of nodes coded in January and September, and a lower 
number in March and August (Figure 2). The number of nodes coded by time of 
day was unremarkable. The number of nodes coded by control function are shown 
in Figure 3. TRACON shows higher number of nodes. Finally, the number of nodes 
coded by flight phase is shown in Figure 4. Descent, approach (initial and final), 
and climb show the highest occurrences while taxi, landing, and parked show the 
lowest number of occurrences. The data displayed in Figure 5 is the same data 
displayed in Figure 4, but it is displayed in three dimensions. 
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Figure 2. Nodes coded by Month. 
 
 
Figure 3. Nodes coded by Control Function. 
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Figure 4. Nodes coded by Flight Phase (Two-Dimensional). 
 
 









Next, the hierarchy map function was used to visually display hierarchy of 
coding of control function to flight phase, and is shown at Figure 6. Finally, the 
NVivo cluster analysis function was used to help identify instances when nodes 
occur together, and is shown at Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 6. Hierarchy map of Flight Phase and Control Function.  
 
  
Figure 7. Nodes clustered by coding similarity. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
This qualitative study provides several remarkable results. As depicted in 
Figure 4 more nodes were reported in descent, approach (initial and final), and 
climb than other phases of flight. Descent and approach have increased human-
machine interaction requirements as the aircraft configuration is adjusted for 
arrival. Climb has increased human-machine interaction requirements as the 
aircraft configuration is adjusted for cruise flight. As expected, and shown in Figure 
6, majority of the nodes during descent and initial approach are with TRACON, 
during final approach are with tower, and during climb are with center.  
The nodes mental model influenced by automation interface and attention 
allocation influenced by competing tasks and demands were coded more than any 
other nodes (Figure 5). Additionally, as Figure 7 shows, there is a coding similarity 
between these two codes. This coding similarity is evident in all phases of flight 
except final approach (Figure 5) where there are lower coded occurrences of 
automation allocation influenced by competing tasks and demands, and higher 
coded occurrences of mental model influenced by automation interface. However, 
when compared to other nodes, both nodes were still coded with higher occurrence 
during final approach. The high occurrence and coding similarity in these two nodes 
potentially identified a human-machine interaction hazard associated with poor 
performance. The HASO model in Figure 8 shows an associated path for these two 
nodes where competing tasks and demands influences attention allocation, 
attention allocation influences automation interface, and automation interface 
influences the mental model. This research identified the prevalence of these two 
nodes, but does not provide the granularity to understand what competing tasks and 
demands are influencing attention allocation or what aspects of automation 
interface are influencing the mental model. Further quantitative research could be 
performed to parse out the various aspects of automation interface and competing 
tasks and demands. This type of granularity can provide specific hazards of flight 
operations to mitigate in order to reduce poor performance and increase situation 
awareness. 
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Figure 8. Human-autonomy system oversight (HASO) model with coding high 
occurrence and similarity identified (Endsley, 2017).  
 
The coded occurrences of human-machine interactions in January and 
September are higher than other months. These results cannot be used for 
consideration of prevalence of occurrence; however, the difference deserves notice. 
A potential explanation for this occurrence could include pilot or controller work 
rotations, the start of pilot or controller training programs, change in weather, and 
other factors. It is important to conduct further research to understand the factors 
associated with the monthly variation of reported human-machine interaction 
anomalies.   
 This research supports the HASO model as a construct for designing the 
appropriate amount of human-automation interaction into a system to support 
attention allocation in the performance of tasks. This research identified a high 
prevalence and similarity of coding of mental model influenced by automation 
interface and attention allocation influenced by competing tasks and demands in 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Part 121 reports. Further quantitative 
research could be performed to parse out the various aspects of automation 
interface and competing tasks and demands, and to identify factors influencing 
human-machine interaction during different months.   
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• Attention allocation influenced by situation awareness 
• Attention allocation influenced by automation trust 
• Attention allocation influenced by competing tasks and demands 
 
Automation Trust 
• Automation trust influenced by automation interface 
• Automation trust influenced by automation reliability 
• Automation trust influenced by automation robustness 
• Automation trust influenced by competing tasks and demands 
 
Complexity 
• Complexity influenced by automation interface 
• Complexity influenced by automation interaction paradigm 
 
Engagement influenced by automation interaction paradigm 
 
Mental Model 
• Mental model influenced by automation interface 
• Mental model influenced by complexity 
 
Workload influenced by automation interaction paradigm 
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